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HINTS OF THE FUTURE?: JOHN ROBERTS, JR.'S
FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES AS
AN APPELLATE JUDGE
Thomas K. Clancyt
Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. had a thin paper trail prior to his
appointment to the Supreme Court. He has, however, more of a record in Fourth Amendment1 jurisprudence from his brief time as a
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. How a Supreme Court Justice interprets the Fourth Amendment
is perhaps one of the most important tasks of the position, given the
countless times that the Amendment is implicated each day2 and the
large number of Fourth Amendment cases that reach the Supreme
Court each year. 3 The docket of the D.C. Circuit has a significant
number of criminal cases because of its location in the nation's capital
and the substantial number of criminal cases pursued in its federal
courts. 4 As a D.C. Circuit judge, Judge Roberts sat on eight cases involving Fourth Amendment issues that resulted in published opinions. 5 Of those cases, he authored four for the court and issued one
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
For example, there are approximately 20 million vehicle stops each year.
See Lawrence A. Greenfield, Foreword to U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS STOPPED BY POLICE, 1999,
at iii (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cdsp99.
htm. Similarly, there are millions of airport screenings each year, each of
which must be justified as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS 2005
tb1.2-16a (2005), available at http://www.bts.gov/.
See The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-The Statistics, 118 HARv. L. REv. 497, 50709 (2004). See generally SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2003 YEAREND REpORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, (2004), http://www.supremecourt
us.gov/.
Special Repvrt, Repvrt of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D. C.
Circuit TaskForce on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 189,
193-94 (1996).
See infra Part I.
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notable dissent. 6 He joined the opinion of the court in the three remaining caSeS without authoring an opinion.' This essay examines
those opinions and, in the manner of reading tea-leaves, seeks to
reach some conclusions on his views of the Fourth Amendment.
I.

THE CASES

A.

United States v. Lawson

Writing for the court in United States v. Lawson,s in an appeal from
convictions of aggravated bank robbery and brandishing a firearm
during a crime of violence, Judge Roberts concluded that the search
of an automobile that yielded incriminating evidence against Lawson
was proper. 9 The district court had rejected Lawson's claim on the
ground that Lawson did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.l0 Judge Roberts, for the court of appeals, chose to "affirm on a
different ground-that the search of the Oldsmobile was supported
by probable cause."ll This was despite the fact that the government
had not argued that probable cause justified the search in the lower
court;12 instead, the government raised the issue for the first time in
its appellate brief. In finding probable cause for the seizure and for
conducting the subsequent search, Judge Roberts asserted that the vehicle matched the physical description of the getaway car in a bank
robbery that the police were investigating: "Four out of five numbers
on the temporary license plate matched a witness account of the getaway car's tags. Further, prior to seizing the car, agents 'saw some
latex gloves laying in the right front passenger area.' "13 Based on
those circumstances, he concluded, "it was reasonable for agents to
believe the vehicle contained contraband or instrumentalities of
crime."14
B.

United States v. Jackson

Judge Roberts's only dissent came in United States v. jackson,15 decidedJuly 22, 2005, which was three days after Judge Roberts's nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court. The sole basis for Judge Roberts's
dissent was purportedly factual: he believed that the information available to the police constituted probable cause to search the trunk,16
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Parts I.A.-I.C., I.E.-I.F.
See infra Part I.D.
4lO F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 740-41.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 740 n.4.
Id. at 741 (citation omitted).
Id.
415 F.3d 88 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at lO5-06 (Roberts, j., dissenting).
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although the majority concluded there was insufficient justification
for the searchP However, underlying the majority's and dissent's approaches were fundamental disagreements on how a court should approach probable cause determinations.
The facts were as follows:
1) "At approximately 1:00 a.m. on May 4,2002, United States Park
Police Officers Jeffrey Garboe and Wayne Johnson observed a
1988 Mercury Marquis without a functioning tag light."18
2) The officers stopped the vehicle because of the absence of the
tag light. 19
3) Prior to approaching the car, the police conducted a records
check, which indicated that the car's temporary license tags
had been reported stolen. 20
4) The officers arrested the driver, Tarry M. Jackson, for the stolen tag offense. 21
5) Because Jackson was unable to produce registration or a
driver's license, the officers conducted a more thorough
records check, which indicated that his driving privileges were
suspended in Virginia. 22
6) "The officers also checked the vehicle identification number in
a computer database, and it yielded an 'old listing' from Virginia, meaning that the car had once been registered there but
that it was not currently registered."23
7) "There was no report that the car had been stolen."24
8) The officers searched the passenger compartment of the car
for documentation of ownership, but "did not find any documentation, contraband, or evidence of criminal activity."25
9) One of the officers, Officer Garboe, testified that, on approximately ten previous occasions relating to vehicle stops involving
stolen tags, he had found the vehicle's real tags in the trunk six
or seven times. 26

10) Mter securing the driver, the officers searched the trunk and
recovered a loaded .25 caliber pistol and ammunition. 27
11) At some point, Jackson claimed that the car belonged to his
girlfriend and that she had bought it at an auction a month
earlier. 28
17. Id. at 89-90.
18. Id. at 94-95.
19. Id. at 90.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 102.
27. Id. at 90.
28. Id.
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Supreme Court precedent has established that, although the passenger compartment of a vehicle can be searched incident to the
driver's arrest,29 a trunk in the vehicle cannot be searched. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court has also established that such a trunk
search is permitted, without a warrant, when the police have probable
cause to believe that the trunk has evidence of the crime. 30
A threejudge panel heard the appeal in Jackson: Judge Judith W.
Rogers wrote the opinion for the court; Judge Harry T. Edwards wrote
a concurring opinion, which seemed to comprehensively address the
case and had significantly different reasoning than Rogers's opinion,
making the "majority" opinion a curious one; and Judge Roberts dissented. 31 Rogers's opinion set forth the traditional standard for probable cause and correctly observed that, given that this was a
warrantless search, the government had the burden of proof. 32 Rogers then proceeded to reject the various governmental theories justifYing the search, before settling in on the question upon which she
believed the case turned: Whether there was probable cause to believe
"that documentation demonstrating that the driver was not authorized to drive the car would be in the trunk."33 Rogers believed that
the circumstances known to the police at the time of the trunk search
did not support the view that Jackson was an unauthorized driver. 34
She serially rejected the computer record checks, the fruitless search
of the passenger compartment, the suspended driver's license, the
driving late at night, the broken tag light, and the lack of registration
as affecting the probability that Jackson was an unauthorized user. 35
She believed that the stolen tags were the "critical feature" of the traffic stop.36 Rejecting that feature, Rogers stated that there were only
three reasons why the stolen tags would be on the car:
First, stolen tags may be placed on an otherwise lawfully used
car without tags to give the appearance of legitimate tags and
therefore to reduce the risk that the police will initiate a traffic stop for lack of tags. Second, stolen tags may be used to
replace expired tags on an otherwise lawfully used vehicle,
again in the hope of avoiding immediate detection. The lack
of registration and the absence of a report that the car was
29. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 n.4 (1981) (holding that
incident to an arrest of an automobile occupant, police may search only the
interior passenger compartment of the automobile).
30. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1991) (interpreting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925), to provide that police
may search an automobile and its containers if they have probable cause to
believe that contraband or evidence is contained therein).
31. Jackson, 415 F.3d at 88, 98-101.
32. Id. at 91-92.
33. Id. at 92-93.
34. Id. at 94.
35. Id. at 93-94.
36. Id. at 94.
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stolen are consistent with these first two rationales, which
suggest that the driver was an authorized user of the car.
Third, stolen tags may be used to conceal the fact that a vehicle is stolen by replacing the stolen vehicle's "real tags." ...
Because the officers here were confronted with three possible explanations for the presence of the stolen tags on the
car, two of which suggested authorized use and were consistent with the lack of registration and the absence of a report
that the car was stolen, and only one of which supported an
inference of unauthorized use, the officers lacked probable
cause to search the trunk for documentation that the driver
was an unauthorized user of the car.
While the existence of probable cause does not depend on
the elimination of all innocent explanations for a situation,
our dissenting colleague ... posits the most incriminating
interpretation of the circumstances, as though the existence
of countervailing probabilities was irrelevant. Were that the
law, then the government's burden would be considerably
eased, for the particular circumstances causing the police to
make a traffic stop could often be viewed most negatively
without regard to a citizen's Fourth Amendment protections.
Our dissenting colleague emphasizes that Officer Garboe
also testified that on six or seven occasions he had encountered vehicles with stolen tags that had "real tags" or other
identifying information in the trunk . . . . Even if there was
probable cause to believe that the trunk would contain the
car's expired "real tags," these tags, like a tool kit, are neither
contraband nor evidence of a crime because there is nothing
illegal about having such tags in the trunk of an unregistered
car. In overlooking this point, our dissenting colleague
posits an evidentiary inference based on finding "real tags"
in the trunk that is irrelevant in the absence of probable
cause to believe that the trunk contained contraband or evidence of a crime. Further, the record does not indicate that
the car's expired "real tags" would provide the officers with
any additional information regarding the ownership of the
car because a records check based on the vehicle identification number indicated only an "old listing." In any event,
even if "real tags" or identifying information could in some
instances constitute contraband or evidence of a crime, the
officer's prior experience of finding such information in a
vehicle trunk, while relevant, is unhelpful here because his
testimony is devoid of the critical circumstances of those
searches, including whether the identifying information revealed that the vehicle was stolen. 37
37. [d. at 94-95 (citation omitted).
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Judge Rogers added some advice for the police: Instead of searching the truck, she opined, the police should have continued their investigation by questioning Jackson "to determine whether it would be
reasonable to conclude that documentation of the driver's unauthorized use of the car would be in the trunk."38 She opined that Jackson
had been cooperative. 39
Judge Edwards, in his concurring opinion, rejected the contention
that the police had reason to believe that the car was stolen "because
the police officers knew that the car was unregistered and that it had not
been reported stolen."40 He reasoned:
If a car is not registered, then it has no legitimate tags.
The most reasonable inference to be drawn in this situation
is that the owner has placed stolen tags on the car to avoid
being stopped for driving without tags, while avoiding the
expense attendant to registering the car and obtaining legitimate tags. In other words, if a car has no legitimate tags because it is unregistered, then police officers have no good
reason to assume that the stolen tags are intended to conceal
the true identity of the vehicleY
Edwards's opinion also discussed the importance of the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees and the duties of judges to jealously guard
the rights of individuals. 42 Judge Roberts, dissenting, replied:
I wholeheartedly subscribe to the sentiments expressed in
the concurring opinion about the Fourth Amendment's place
among our most prized freedoms. But sentiments do not decide cases; facts and the law do. There is no dispute here on
the law: if the officers had probable cause, they did not need
a warrant; if they did not have probable cause, no warrant
would issue in any event. As for the facts, the officers encountered at 1 :00 a.m. an unlicensed driver operating an unregistered car with a broken tag light and stolen tags. The
experienced district court judge concluded-and I agreethat "the circumstances were suspicious enough to amount
to probable cause to search the trunk." Right or wrong,
nothing about that determination reflected insensitivity to
constitutional values, any more than a contrary determination would have reflected insensitivity to the needs of law
enforcemen t. 43
Earlier in his opinion, Judge Roberts demonstrated that he not only
disputed the importance of the facts but that his view of the tools to
38. Id. at
39. Id. at
40. Id. at
41. Id.
42. Id. at
43. Id. at

96.
97.
100 (Edwards, j., concurring).
100-01 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961».
105-06 (Roberts, j., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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measure probable cause differed markedly from the majority. Judge
Roberts viewed the facts together:
It was late at night and the tag light was out-suggesting
from the beginning of the encounter that Jackson was attempting to obscure the car's license plates. Once Jackson
was pulled over, the officers learned there was indeed something to hide: the temporary tags affixed to the car had been
stolen and altered to match the car's make, model, and vehicle identification number. 44
He made inferences from those facts, based on prior case law45 and
the experience of the officers: 46
Stolen tags often accompany stolen cars. The reason is obvious: by replacing the real tags with stolen tags, the thief
makes it impossible for police to identify a stolen vehicle by
sight. A stolen vehicle will normally be described by its
make, model, and license plate number. An officer cruising
the streets cannot readily identify a particular Mercury Marquis as the stolen Mercury Marquis if the original tags have
been replaced. So the stolen tags raised a suspicion that the
car may have been stolen as well. 47
Judge Roberts believed that the records check added to the police's
suspicion:
To the officers on the scene, ... the failure of the records
check to resolve ownership of the vehicle was unusual. The
fact that Jackson was not listed on the car's last registration
could reasonably have heightened the officers' suspicion:
now they were dealing not only with a car with stolen tags,
but with a car that had no recorded connection to Jackson. 48
Turning specifically to why the search of the trunk was reasonable,
Judge Roberts observed:
One of the officers at the scene would later testify that he
had made about ten previous vehicle stops involving stolen
tags. On six or seven of those occasions, he had found the
vehicle's real tags in the trunk. This is not especially surprising: the trunk is certainly a convenient place to stash the real
44. Id. at 101.
45. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Rhind, 289 F.3d 690, 692 (11th Cir. 2002)
(stating that the defendants traveled in a stolen car with stolen plates).
46. Jackson, 415 F.3d at 101. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 623 A.2d 1170,
1172 (D.C. 1993) (referring to police officer's comment that stolen plates
often accompany stolen vehicles).
47. Jackson, 415 F.3d at 101 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 101-02 (citing to Officer Garboe's statement: "Normally if you run [a
registration check] having already run the operator, it'll tell you that it
comes back with an expired listing to that operator. And that was not the case
in this case.") (citation omitted).

192

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 35

tags once they have been removed from the back of the vehicle. Real tags in the trunk would clearly be probative evidence suggesting the car was stolen, for the reason just
noted: car thieves replace the real tags with stolen ones to
help avoid detection. 49
Judge Roberts noted that there could have been other evidence in
the trunk tending to show who the real owner was or supporting the
view that Jackson stole the vehicle. 50 Finally,Judge Roberts viewed the
permissible inferences from the facts known to the police much differently than his colleagues. First, because the car was unregistered did
not mean that the vehicle's license plates disappeared once its registration lapsed. 51 He asserted that many people receive tickets for expired registrations "but they are usually able to show that they are the
owner listed on the expired registration."52 Because Jackson was not
able to demonstrate ownership, it "heighten [ed] the suspicion that he
had no legitimate connection to the car."53 Moreover, Judge Roberts
believed:
[F]inding the expired "real tags" would have provided police
with additional evidence of criminal activity. . . . [T] he real
tags would have ruled out the possibility the stolen tags were
being used only to drive a vehicle that otherwise had no tags,
making it more likely that the vehicle had been stolen. 54
Second, asserting that "'a page of history is worth a volume of
logic,' "55 Judge Roberts believed that Officer Garboe's history with
stolen tags, which "confirmed that they, more often than not, led to
real tags in the trunk," and the reported cases, which "confirm that
criminals often use stolen tags on stolen cars," were "enough to support the officers' inferring from the stolen tags and the lack of any
registration (current or expired) linking Jackson to the car that the
car might well have been stolen."56 He added that "replacing a stolen
vehicle's original tags makes sense: it prevents the vehicle from being
readily identified as stolen by a passing police cruiser."57 Although a
police officer could run those tags, "busy" police officers were unlikely
to do so each time a Mercury Marquis was observed, "and people are
likely to be much less diligent about reporting stolen tags-particularly temporary ones-than stolen cars."58
49. Id. at 102.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 102-03.
52. Id. at 103.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Third, as to the majority's claims that the officers lacked probable
cause because only one of the majority's three possible explanations
for the presence of the stolen tags on the car supported an inference
of unauthorized use, Judge Roberts initially disagreed with the assumption "that someone would run so great a risk [of putting a stolen
tag on a vehicle] merely to avoid getting stopped for an expired registration."59 "The more serious problem" with the majority's approach,
Judge Roberts believed:
[I] s that probable cause does not depend on eliminating
other innocent (or, here, less incriminating) explanations
for a suspicious set of facts. Of course, considering alternative explanations is "often helpful," but the officers were not
required, before searching the trunk, to negate the possibility that the stolen tags were used only to drive an unregistered car. This is particularly so here, where any plausible
explanation for the circumstances of Jackson's stop-the
broken tag light, the stolen tags, Jackson's lack of registration, and the failure of the records check to connect Jackson
with the vehicle-suggested that Jackson was deliberately trying to conceal unlawful activity involving the car itself.60
Fourth, Judge Roberts viewed the majority's suggestion that the police should have asked Jackson about the vehicle's ownership as "a
hazardous approach to assessing probable cause."61 He believed that
it "assumes that the officers had nothing better to do while on night
patrol than linger roadside, tracking down exculpatory leads for suspects."62 Instead, Judge Roberts believed that "[t]he officers could
have reasonably concluded that further questioning would have
yielded nothing more than the usual story any suspect in Jackson's
situation would be expected to deliver," that is, his girlfriend owned
the car. 63 Judge Roberts asserted: "Sometimes a car being driven by
an unlicensed driver, with no registration and stolen tags, really does
belong to the driver's friend, and sometimes dogs do eat homework,
but in neither case is it reasonable to insist on checking out the story
before taking other appropriate action."64 Even if the police had contactedJackson's girlfriend,Judge Roberts could not "see any conceivable value in the over-the-phone testimony of a suspect's apparent
girlfriend-someone unknown to the officers, whose number was
given to them by the suspect himself-that an unregistered car with
stolen tags, driven by an unlicensed driver, was indeed hers and was
59. Id.
60. Id. at 103-04 (quoting United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.
2003» (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 104.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 105.
64. Id.
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being used with her permission."65 Finally, Judge Roberts maintained
that the court had "neither the authority nor the expertise" to prescribe "preferred investigative procedures for law enforcement" and
that he "would leave the judgment as to what lines of inquiry ought to
be pursued to the officer himself, and judge probable cause on the
facts as they are, rather than on what they might have been had the
officer pursued a different course."66
C.

United States v. Holmes

In United States v. Holmes,67 Judge Roberts wrote an opinion for the
court affirming the denial of a motion to suppress, based on a stop
and frisk.68 Holmes's vehicle was speeding and police officers following the vehicle observed Holmes "continually dipping his right shoulder, as if he were reaching under the driver's seat."69 Upon observing
this, one of the police officers, Dereck Phillip, concluded that Holmes
was either retrieving or placing a weapon under his seat. 70 As the officers approached the vehicle on foot after Holmes had stopped,
Holmes was nervously looking over his shoulder, moving around in
the vehicle, and reaching under his seat and toward his waist. 71 Upon
making contact with Holmes, the police detected "a strong odor of
alcohol," and Holmes admitted that he had been drinking.72 After
Holmes got out of the car, he reached several times toward the rear
pocket of his pants, even after being directed by one of the officers
not to do SO.73 The police believed he was armed. 74
Holmes was frisked and during the course of the pat-down, a
"'hard,' 'square object'" was detected in the front pocket of the huge
jacket he was wearing. 75 Holmes told Phillip that it was a scale, and
Phillip later testified that he thought it was a scale and not a firearm. 76
Nonetheless, Phillip removed the object, confirmed that it was a scale,
and "noticed a white residue on the scale.'>77 After Phillip resumed
the pat-down, Holmes struck Phillip and "[a] melee ensued.',78
Holmes was eventually restrained and arrested. 79 Holmes, as well as
his vehicle, was then searched, with a gun and cocaine among the
65. [d.
66. [d.
67. 385 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1388 (2005).
68. [d. at 787.
69. [d.
70. [d.
71. [d. at 787-88.
72. [d. at 788.

73. [d.
74. [d.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

2005]

Hints of the Future?

195

incriminating evidence recovered; the gun was located under the
driver's seat. 80
Holmes challenged the removal of the scale from his pocket as exceeding the scope of a permissible frisk and the recovery of the other
evidence as a fruit of that alleged illegality.8l Recognizing that "[t]he
propriety of a search ... depends on 'an objective assessment of the
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
[Phillip] at the time,' and not on the officer's own subjective intent,"
Judge Roberts viewed the fact that Phillip believed that the item was a
scale as not determining the inquiry.82 Instead, Judge Roberts reasoned, "[t]he only relevant question [was] whether a reasonable officer, knowing what Phillip knew at the moment of seizure, would
have been justified in removing the scale."83 Concluding that the circumstances justified the removal of the object, Judge Roberts asserted
that "the Fourth Amendment does not require the officer to gamble
his safety and that of those around him on the accuracy of ... assumptions."84 Specifically, Phillip "did not have to take Holmes at his word
that the object was a scale, and proceed with the frisk solely on that
basis."85 He concluded: "We cannot fault the officer for taking the
simple step of checking to ensure that the hard object was not something more threatening before continuing. The object did not feel
like a firearm, but it could have been another type of weapon-a box
cutter, for example."86 Because the permissible "scope of a Terry frisk
is not limited to weapons, but rather to 'concealed objects which might
be used as instruments of assault,''' Judge Roberts believed that the
"'hard,' 'square' object" that Phillip felt "would seem to fit that
description well."87

D.

The No opinion Cases: Riley, Moore, and Brown

Two of the three cases that Judge Roberts joined without an opinion were unremarkable applications of established case law to the
facts. United States v. Riley88 was an appeal following a conviction for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 89 The court of appeals, in
an opinion by Stephen F. Williams, Senior CircuitJudge, held that the
police had probable cause to arrest Riley, based on a combination of a
reliable informant's tip and the police's confirmation of innocent details, and that the search of Riley was valid as a search incident to his
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 790 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978».
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 790-91.
Id. (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968».
351 F.3d 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1266.
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arrest. 90 United States v. Moore 9l involved the appeal of the denial of a
motion to suppress after conviction of Moore for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 92 In an opinion by Chief Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, the court of appeals held that, given the taxi's location and its
erratic movements, there was reasonable suspicion that the driver was
being robbed and this justified a stop of the taxicab in which Moore
was a passenger.93
The third case that Judge Roberts joined without opinion, United
States v. Brown,94 involved a government appeal from the granting of a
motion to suppress physical evidence found in a trunk of a vehicle. 95
Brown started as a valid traffic stop for speeding, but after it was established that Brown did not have a valid District of Columbia driver's
license, he was arrested. 96 The officer then searched the passenger
compartment incident to that arrest. 97 During that search, several
documents that the appellate court believed would have led an objective observer to conclude were fraudulent were found: driver's licenses, an American Express card, and a personal check. 98 The
officer then searched the trunk, believing that he could do so "incident to Brown's arrest."99 A firearm was recovered, which was the basis for Brown's prosecution for "possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon."loo
The lower court properly recognized that the arrest did not authorize the search of the trunk; it granted suppression of the evidence in
the trunk because the officer did not provide any testimony as to why
he believed that there was probable cause to search the trunk. 101 In
an opinion by Judge A. Raymond Randolph, the appellate court
agreed that the police officer "misunderstood the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment."I02 But it also believed that the lower court
erred in suppressing the evidence. lo3 Relying on precedent, Judge
Randolph observed that the issue of whether an officer has probable
cause to search a trunk is a purely objective standard, turning on
whether "a 'prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer'" under the
circumstances presented, would have "believe[d] that there was a rea90. Id. at 1266-69.

91. 394 F.3d 925 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
92. Id. at 926.
93. Id. at 926-27, 930.
94. 374 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cen. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1369 (2005).
95. Id. at 1326.
96. Id. at 1326-27.
97. Id. at 1327.
98. Id. at 1327-28.
99. Id. at 1327.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1327-28.
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sonable likelihood the trunk contained contraband."lo4 Applying that
standard to the facts, Judge Randolph concluded that there was probable cause to believe that the documents found in the passenger compartment were for the purpose of making fraudulent purchases. lo5
Further, Randolph found "it is reasonable to assume that [Brown]
had successfully accomplished his objective, which brings us to the
trunk of the car."I06 Trunks are designed to store or conceal items;
hence, Randolph believed that there was a "distinct possibility that the
trunk contained earlier purchases."107 He therefore concluded that
the search of the trunk was proper. 108
E.

Hedgepeth v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

In popular culture, it is perhaps the "french-fry" case for which
Judge Roberts will be remembered based on his brief tenure on the
court of appeals. In Hedgepeth v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority,109 12-year-old Ansche Hedgepeth was arrested for eating a
french fry in a Metrorail station. I 10 Writing for the court, Judge Roberts's opening lines properly framed the situation:
No one is very happy about the events that led to this litigation. A twelve-year-old girl was arrested, searched, and handcuffed. Her shoelaces were removed, and she was
transported in the windowless rear compartment of a police
vehicle to a juvenile processing center, where she was
booked, fingerprinted, and detained until released to her
mother some three hours later-all for eating a single french
fry in a Metrorail station. The child was frightened, embarrassed, and crying throughout the ordeal. The district court
described the policies that led to her arrest as "foolish," and
indeed the policies were changed after those responsible endured the sort of publicity reserved for adults who make
young girls cry. The question before us, however, is not
whether these policies were a bad idea, but whether they violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.
Like the district court, we conclude that they did not, and
accordingly we affirm. III
Putting aside the Fifth Amendment claim, which is beyond the purpose of this discussion, Judge Roberts quickly turned to the recent
104. [d. at 1328 (quoting United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir.
1972».
105. [d. at 1328-29.
106. [d. at 1329.
107. [d.
108. [d.
109. 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
110. [d. at 1150-51.
111. [d. at 1150.
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Supreme Court opinion in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,112 where the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when an officer arrested a woman for violating a state statute that required all
motorists and front-seat passengers to wear seatbelts. 113 In Atwater, it
was a given that the officer had probable cause to arrest. Atwater,
however, sought to restrict the ability of the police to arrest for minor
offenses, such as seatbelt violations, and require that they instead issue
citations in lieu of a custodial arrest. 114 The Atwater majority engaged
in an extensive analysis of the history and policies underlying the
Fourth Amendment. It ultimately concluded that the existence of
probable cause was the core protection afforded by the Amendment
in such circumstances and suggested that it was up to politically accountable officials to impose limitations, if any, on the discretion of
the police to arrest for minor crimes. 115
Mter summarizing the Atwater Court's analysis, Judge Roberts in
Hedgepeth easily concluded that Atwater precluded the court from engaging "in an evaluation of the reasonableness of the decision to arrest Ansche, given the existence of probable cause."116 That was
undoubtedly an accurate interpretation of Atwater, which was dispositive of the claim before the court. Judge Roberts could have ended
his opinion at that point. Instead, he went on and assumed that
Atwater was "not controlling" and asserted:
[Hedgepeth's] claim that a policy of mandatory arrest for
certain minor offenses is unconstitutional boils down to an
assertion that officer discretion is a necessary element of a
valid seizure under the Fourth Amendment, at least for some
minor offenses. She has not made an effort to defend that
assertion under the usual first step of any analysis of whether
particular government action violates the Fourth Amendment-asking "whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the
Amendment was framed." Moreover, insisting on the exercise of discretion by an arresting officer would be an unfamiliar imperative under the Fourth Amendment. "The essential
purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to
impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of
discretion by government officials .... " It is the high office
of the Fourth Amendment to constrain law enforcement discretion; we see no basis for turning the usual Fourth Amendment approach on its head and finding a government
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

532 U.S. 318 (2001); Hedgepeth, 386 F.3d at 1157.
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323.
See id. at 346-49.
Id. at 352, 354.
Hedgepeth, 386 F.3d at 1157-58.
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practice unconstitutional solely because it lacks a sufficient
role for discretionary judgment. 1l7
F.

Stewart v. Evans

In Stewart v. Evans, Stewart, a federal employee, sued the Secretary
of Commerce and two departmental employees, alleging discrimination. 1lS Stewart claimed that the two employees, who were employed
in the department's Office of General Counsel (OGC), had illegally
searched her private documents pertaining to the discrimination complaint, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 119 The documents had
been turned over to other departmental officials to insure compliance
with an unrelated Freedom of Information Act request and a later
request from a United States Senator. 120 In turning the documents
over, Stewart obtained an agreement that OGC employees would not
be allowed to view them.12l The documents were kept in a locked safe
in another employee's office in the Special Matters Unit (SMU),
which handled Congressional requests. 122 Nonetheless, an employee
of the OGC, acting at the direction of another OGC employee,
opened the safe and reviewed the documents. 123 The documents
were later found responsive to the Congressional request and turned
over to Congress. 124 Mter her suit had been dismissed by the district
court,125 the court of appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Roberts,
held that Stewart did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in
the documents nor in the locked safe containing them. 126
Judge Roberts reasoned that Stewart "had no control whatever over
access to the office containing the safe or to the safe itself."127 As to
the documents, Judge Roberts reasoned that Stewart lost her expectation of privacy in them "because she had voluntarily relinquished control of them" when she "gave the documents to third parties."128
Judge Roberts added:
The reason Stewart transferred the documents is highly pertinent. In each instance her transfer was the first step in a
process that could-and, in the case of the SMU review,
did-result in broader disclosure of the documents, beyond
even the third parties to whom Stewart conveyed them.
117. [d. at 1159 (citation omitted).
118. 351 F.3d 1239, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
119. [d. at 1241-42.
120. [d. at 1241.
121. [d.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

[d.
[d. at 1242.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 1244.
[d. at 1243.
[d.
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When the threat of mandatory disclosure accompanies the
transfer of documents to a third party, little reasonable expectation of privacy exists. 129
Finally, Judge Roberts rejected Stewart's argument that the agreement she brokered, restricting access to the documents, preserved her
expectation of privacy. Judge Roberts observed that the agreement
was to allow for the review of the documents and "not to preserve
their privacy more generally."130 He therefor~ concluded: "The
Fourth Amendment protects privacy; it does not constitutionalize nondisclosure agreements."131 Thus, he rejected Stewart's claim, relying
on Supreme Court precedent that has established that "the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to
a third party ... even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed."132

II.

OBSERVATIONS

A.

Probable Cause and Articulable Suspicion Determinations

Judge Roberts has sat on four cases involving probable cause determinations, ruling each time against the person seeking to suppress
129. Id. at 1244 (citing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)
("[T]here can be little expectation of privacy where records are [transferred] ... knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information
therein is required ....
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976». There is a
burgeoning amount of information held by third parties and used by law
enforcement. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1089-1101 (2002) (cataloguing
this development). Numerous commentators have argued for Fourth
Amendment protections extending to information held by third parties.
See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Suroeillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 CEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1375, 1403-12 (2004) (arguing that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications held by internet service providers).
Some, as has Professor LaFave, distinguish between the type of information
given to the third party and the purposes for which the third party has been
given the information and conclude that a person may retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in some circumstances. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 2.6(f) (4th ed. 2004). There is a recent case, which is perhaps a mere aberration, that indicates that the Court may adopt a similar
analysis. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (finding
a reasonable expectation of privacy by a patient in information conveyed to
medical personnel and stating: "The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that
the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent."). Roberts, however, relied on Couch and Miller, which
represent the Court's otherwise consistent view that persons who disclose
information to third parties lose their expectation of privacy in that information. Stewart, 351 F.3d at 1224; see Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; Couch, 409 U.S.
at 335-36.

"».
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evidence. 133 He sided with the court, without opinion, in Riley and
Brown;134 he authored the opinion for a unanimous court in Lawson;135 and he dissented inJackson. 136 Clearly, Judge Roberts does not
have a high standard for finding probable cause. Nor does his view of
articulable suspicion, as evidenced by Moore and Holmes, appear to be
particularly demanding. 137 Individualized suspicion,138 be it reasonable suspicion or probable cause, requires, based on the whole picture,
that the detaining officers have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped or arrested of criminal activity.139 The concept of probable cause is a familiar but fluid standard
for a court to apply.140 "In dealing with probable cause ... , as the
name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."141 The
totality of the circumstances is taken into account to determine
whether there is a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place."142 The divide in Jackson
demonstrates that lower court judges continue to bring different perspectives to the analysis of probable cause. 143 Indeed, many judges
and legal scholars undoubtedly believe that Judge Roberts's probable
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

139.

140.

141.

142.
143.

See supra Parts l.A.-B., I.D.
See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part LA.
See supra Part LB.
See supra Parts I.C.-D.
For the role that individualized suspicion plays in Fourth Amendment analysis, see Thomas K. Clancy, the Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness,
2004 UTAH L. REv. 977 (2004); Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized
Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L.
REv. 483 (1995).
See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (all of the factors
justifYing a stop, examined separately, can be "quite consistent" with innocent behavior but, when examined together, can still "amount to reasonable suspicion"); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277-78 (2002) (stop
of vehicle justified based on a combination of factors, all innocuous by
themselves, but in combination sufficient to create articulable suspicion of
drug smuggling).
See generally Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable
Cause, 74 MISS. LJ. 279 (2004) (comprehensively examining the concept of
probable cause).
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). Accord Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). The Supreme Court has rejected assigning a numerical marker for probable cause and, certainly, its conception of it has varied over time. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235
(1983) (not helpful to fix a "numerically precise degree of certainty" to
probable cause determination but it is less than a preponderance standard
only the probability); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) (probable
cause does not require fine tuning of evidence that even the "preponderance standard demands").
Gates, 462 U.S. at 23B.
See supra Part I.B.
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cause threshold, as articulated in Jackson, is set too low. 144 However,
his methodology and conclusions in Jackson are more in tune with the
current Supreme Court's analysis than the majority and concurring
opinions. Indeed, the Supreme Court repeatedly has examined individualized suspicion cases in recent decades and those opinionsoften unanimous-demonstrate that the probable cause 145 and reasonable suspicion standards 146 are not high barriers. This is to say
that Judge Roberts's probable cause analysis fits comfortably with the
Supreme Court's current collective view.
Courts permit police officers, based on their training and experience, to make logical inferences from the information known and
courts give deference to a police officer's evaluation of the circumstances. 147 Judge Rogers in her opinion in Jackson, as well as Judge
Edwards in his concurring opinion, did not defer to the police's expertise or conclusions; instead, those opinions reflect an intense scrutiny of the facts, with reliance on their own possible innocent
explanations to overcome incriminating inferences, serving to defeat
the police's conclusions that there was probable cause to search. If
that mode of analysis is imposed on the police, they would in many
instances be paralyzed; they are investigators, not adjudicators. Judge
Roberts, in rejecting the majority's analysis, is more in tune with established Supreme Court precedent, which recognizes that "probable
144. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE,

REpORT ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN G. ROBERTS
TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 88 (2005), available at http://www.

supremecourtwatch.org/robertsprehearing.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,2005).
145. See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369, 371-72 (2003) (police had
probable cause to arrest all the occupants of a car in which drugs and a roll
of cash were found in the passenger compartment after all the occupants
denied possession).
146. The reasonable suspicion standard, required for a stop, is less demanding
than that for probable cause but the Court has never identified that quantum of suspicion needed with any precision. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Nonetheless, the Court has repeatedly held that
the amount of information available to the officer at the time of a stop
need not be great. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000)
(unprovoked flight of suspect in high crime area); United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266, 277-78 (2002) (stop of vehicle justified based on a combination of factors, all innocuous by themselves, but in combination sufficient
to create articulable suspicion of drug smuggling). But see Florida v. J.L.,
529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000) (anonymous tip insufficient to justifY stop).
147. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). The Ornelas
court pointed out that reviewing courts should give deference both to trial
courts and to police officers' inferences drawn from the facts surrounding
an encounter by saying:
A trial judge views the facts of a particular case in light of the
distinctive features and events of the community; likewise, a police
officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and
expertise. The background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve
deference.
Id.
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cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity .... [and] therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of
probable cause."148
The application of an objective standard 149 to uphold the police
actions, as employed in Brown and Holmes, may appear inconsistent
with the principle that courts should defer to the police's evaluation
of the circumstances. Indeed, in both of those cases the police had
actual beliefs that undermined the rationales for the searches: in
Brown, the officer mistakenly believed that he could search the trunk
incident to arrest;150 in Holmes, the officer believed that the hard object he was touching during the pat-down was a scale and not a
weapon. 151 However, the officer's mistake in Brown was one of law,
that is, whether he could permissibly search the trunk incident to
Brown's arrest. 152 There was no dispute as to the underlying facts and
the appellate court properly applied the correct legal framework to
148. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). Also consistent with Roberts's view in Jackson, the Supreme Court has not dictated the manner in
which the police must conduct an investigation. Instead, the police actions
are merely measured for their reasonableness. See United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1985) ("[C] reative judges engaged in
post hoc evaluations of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished." (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,686-87 (1985))).
Cf Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983) (a Terry investigation "at
close range" requires the officer to make a "quick decision as to how to
protect himself and others from possible danger" and there is no requirement "that officers adopt alternative means to ensure their safety in order
to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter" (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,24,28 (1968))).
149. On the level of individual encounters of the police and citizens, one of the
main principles of Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on examining the
objective aspects of the encounter and not by inquiry into the officer's actual, subjective intent to determine if the police intrusions were justified.
See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-14 (1996) (collecting
cases and rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges based on officers' actual
motivations); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989) (inquiry
into subjective intent inappropriate); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,
575 n.7 (1988) ("[T]he subjective intent of the officers is relevant to an
assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police conduct only
to the extent that intent has been conveyed to the person confronted.");
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (Fourth Amendment violation is objective inquiry and does not depend on the officer's state of
mind); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (emphasizing examination of officers' actions and not their state of mind); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (for search incident to arrest, it does
not matter that officer did not subjectively fear suspect or believe that the
suspect might be armed).
150. United States v. Brown, 374 F.3d 1326, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 1369 (2005).
15I. United States v. Holmes, 385 F.3d 786, 788, 790 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1388 (2005).
152. Brown, 374 F.3d at 1327.
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those facts; that is, the search was justified by probable cause to believe
that evidence of a crime would be located in the trunk. No deference
to the police's evaluation of the law was required or merited.
The situation in Holmes, however, was much different. In that case,
the appellate court substituted its factual conclusions for those of the
police officer. That is not a proper application of an objective analysis
of the events-it is a rewriting of the events. In Holmes, as a matter of
fact, Officer Phillip concluded that the object he was feeling in
Holmes' pocket was not a firearm but was a scale. 153 He had a sound
basis for that conclusion: his previous observations of Holmes had led
Phillip to conclude that Holmes might be "armed;"154 Phillip's own
tactile examination of Holmes informed him that the object was not a
gun but a '''hard,' 'square' object"; and when Holmes said the object
was a scale, Phillip's sense of touch led him to conclude that the object was a scale. 155 Judge Roberts, instead of crediting that factual
conclusion, essentially rejected it and asserted that a reasonable officer in Phillip's situation would have been justified in removing the
object to ascertain what the object was. 156 This mode of analysis is not
only inconsistent with Judge Roberts's own position in Jackson but also
with Supreme Court authority, both of which acknowledge that courts
should defer to the factual conclusions of police officers and the logical inferences from those conclusions. Applied to Holmes, this mode
of analysis means that the court was faced with a situation where the
officer actually believed he was touching a scale, not a weapon.
It is difficult to extrapolate from that actual belief of Phillip to an
objective analysis that would have justified the removal of the object.
One must seriously question Judge Roberts's conclusion that a reasonable police officer in Phillip's position would have believed that the
"'hard,' 'square' object" might be a weapon. Phillip was looking for a
gun, based on his observations of Holmes's activities prior to and during the stop, and his conclusions about those actions. 157 Phillip knew
that the object he was touching was not a gun; he had no reason to
suspect that Holmes had any other weapons; and he thought that the
object was a scale. 158 It seems untenable that a reasonable officer
under the circumstances would conclude that the object was possibly a
weapon.
B.

The Scope of a Permissible Frisk

There is a second, more fundamental reason to question Judge
Roberts's decision in Holmes: he misapprehended the permissible
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Holmes, 385 F.3d at 788.
Id. at 787-88.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 790.
Id. at 787-88.
Id. at 790.
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scope of a Terry 159 frisk. A frisk, that is, a protective search of suspects
for weapons, is a limited intrusion designed solely to insure the safety
of the police officer and others while the officer is conducting a criminal investigation. 160 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a
protective search is "a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment"161 and that such an intrusion is "an annoying, frightening, and
perhaps humiliating experience."162 On the other hand, the Court
has also recognized the importance of the "immediate interest of the
police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him."163
A protective search is justified when an officer has articulable suspicion that the person detained is armed and dangerous. 164 However,
"[t]he manner in which [a] ... search [is] conducted is ... [just] as
vital a part of the inquiry as whether [it is] warranted at all."165 A
protective search for weapons must be "confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer."166 "If the
protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the
suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry."167
Thus, for example, in Minnesota v. Dickerson, a police officer detected no weapon-like objects during the course of a "patdown search"
of the front of the suspect's body.168 The frisk did reveal, however, "a
small lump" in the suspect's pocket. 169 Mter" 'squeezing, sliding and
otherwise manipulating'" the lump, the officer concluded that it was
crack cocaine and retrieved it from the pocket. 170 The Court found
the search constitutionally invalid,l71 reasoning that, "[a]lthough the
officer was lawfully in a position to feel the lump in respondent'S
pocket, because Terry entitled him to place his hands upon respondent's jacket," the officer exceeded the scope of a Terry search after
concluding that the object was not a weapon. 172
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993).
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id. at 378 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992), affd,
508 U.S. 366 (1993)).
171. Id. at 378-79.
172. Id. at 379.
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There are several interrelated considerations that measure the
proper scope of a protective search. 173 Two are relevant to the Holmes
fact pattern. The first is the level of assurance the police may obtain
in satisfying themselves that the suspect they are confronting is not
armed. As discussed elsewhere, "an officer may be only reasonably
assured that the person the officer is confronting is not armed; this is
to say that the police must accept some uncertainty when confronting
suspects."174 To permit the officer to obtain certainty or a high degree of confidence that the person is not armed would allow the most
intrusive of searches, akin to a search incident to arrest. Such a rule
eliminates the structure that Terry sought to create: for arrests, based
on probable cause, a full search; for stops, based on articulable suspicion, a more limited intrusion to protect the police during their investigation. This two-level structure was designed to correlate the need
to intrude with the degree of intrusion, thereby preventing unjustified
intrusions into a person's security.
Thus, Terry contemplated a more limited intrusion than
would be obtained if complete assurance were the goal. The
level of justification for an investigatory stop also points to
the conclusion that the police may not obtain absolute assurance that the person is not armed. Investigative stops are
justified by reasonable suspicion that the person has or is
about to commit a crime and a protective search is similarly
justified if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Thus, the State's interest or its
need here is not as great as in the search incident to arrest
situation. Accordingly, the officer's level of assurance that
the person is not armed should be analogous to the justification for the protective search. It follows that an officer must
accept some uncertainty whether the person he is confronting is armed; he can be only reasonably assured that the
suspect is not armed. 175
A second factor refers to limits on the types of weapons for which a
search can be made. Weapons come in a variety of forms and sizes.
In a world where technological innovation continues to confound
traditional Fourth Amendment principles, the police may in the future be confronted with danger from small but deadly weapons. That
is not, however, the situation typically faced by the police today, nor is
there any reason to believe that Officer Phillip was faced with that
situation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that, throughout the long tradition of armed violence by American criminals that
173. See Thomas K. Clancy, Protective Searches, Pat-Downs, or Frisks?: The Scope of a
Permissible Intrusion to Ascertain if a Detained Person is Anned, 82 MARQ. L. REv.

491,525-32 (1999).
174. Id. at 525.
175. Id. at 527.
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has resulted in the deaths and injuries of many law enforcement officers in the line of duty, "[v]irtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns and knives."176 This
raises the question of whether the police should be routinely allowed
to satisfY themselves that the person accosted does not have any weapons, even a razor blade. Some courts permit such searches but others
do not. 177
Some courts "condone fanciful speculation" on this point.
Illustrative are cases holding that an object thought to be a
cigarette lighter may be searched for because "it could be
used in a doubled up fist as a punch or thrown at the officer
or used to bum the officer or the police unit," that a soft
object may be searched for because it might be "a rubber
water pistol loaded with carbolic acid or some other liquid,
which if used by a suspect could permanently blind an officer," and that an object thought to be a shotgun shell could
be searched for because it could be detonated by a sharp
object and the suspect "might want to explode the shell even
in a way which might entail considerable personal risk to
himself."178
Professor LaFave correctly observes that decisions of this type are
unsound. He maintains that the correct view "reflects two ... sensible
considerations: (1) To allow a search for anything which could under
some circumstances be employed as a weapon would be to permit a
search" not dissimilar in intensity from a search incident to arrest;179
and" (2) [i] n determining what objects might be a weapon, consideration must be given to what types of objects could be employed in the
setting of the particular case."180 To these considerations a third
should be added, that is, the principle that an officer may obtain only
reasonable assurance that the person is not armed.
176. Id. at 495 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,23-24 (1968». Since Terry was

177.
178.
179.

180.

decided, the danger for police in the line of duty has drastically increased.
See United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 1994) (reporting
that since Terry, the number of police officers killed annually in the line of
duty has tripled and the number of those assaulted and wounded have
risen by a factor of twenty), cen. denied, 513 U.S. 829 (1994). See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997) (noting that "traffic stops may be
dangerous encounters" and that "[iJn 1994 alone, there were 5,762 officer
assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops").
See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.6(c) (4th ed. 2004).
Id. at 665 (citations omitted) (referencing situations from California cases
regarding these issues).
Id. See also United States v. Del Toro, 464 F.2d 520, 522 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972)
("To take an extreme example, a razor blade could readily be sewn into
clothing, and so support a purported limited search for weapons which included shredding a suspect's clothing or dismantling his shoes.").
LaFave, supra note 177, § 9.6(c) at 666.
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Thus, on the one hand, when an officer has particular information
about the nature of the weapon carried by the suspect but none as to
its location, a fairly intrusive search would be permitted if the weapon
were small. I8 ! For example, if an officer is confronting a person reasonably suspected of using a razor blade as a weapon, then a careful
examination to locate that object is justified. 182 On the other hand,
when an officer has no specific information about the possible location of a weapon on the suspect or any information about the type of
weapon the suspect may have, the search must be limited to fairly
large objects such as guns and knives. I83 Thus, when an officer, during the course of a protective search, discovers a matchbox, even
though such boxes "could hold a razor blade," he has no right to
open it absent any information that the suspect is carrying such a
weapon. I84 In concluding that an officer exceeded the permissible
scope of a protective search when the officer examined the contents
of a man's wallet, one judge has reasoned that
in this case there were no circumstances which would support a reasonable belief that what the officer felt with his
hand contained a weapon. True, it might, and possibly
could, contain a very small but potentially lethal weapon.
Nevertheless, it was an innocuous and ordinary size common
men's wallet without any bulge or other telltale sign, resting
in a commonly located place. The limited authority to intrude ... in a frisk, when the police do not yet have probable
cause, covers objects which may be weapons but not objects
which possibly could contain weapons. If that were the law,
then an officer could reach in and retrieve any item which
felt like a container, including anybody's wallet, because
even a very small container could harbor a razor blade. 185
181. Id. at 665-68.
182. Cf State v. Williams, 544 N.W.2d 350, 351-54 (Neb. 1996) (police officers
permitted to force open clinched fist of suspect to determine if she had a
razor blade or small knife when investigating report of boy that his mother
was being beaten by suspects armed with knives).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Swann, 149 F.3d 271, 276-77 (4th Cir. 1998) (permissible to remove object from sock when, during frisk of suspect, officer
encountered hard object of "approximately the same size and shape as a
box cutter with a sharp blade, which is often used as a weapon"); State v.
Ashbrook, 586 N.w.2d 503, 508-09 (S.D. 1998) (officer acted within scope
of protective search when he examined containers in car that were large
enough and heavy enough to hold a weapon but did not look into smaller
containers).
184. But see Jackson v. State, 804 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (police
officer could seize contraband in matchbox after arrest of suspect based on
reasonable cause to believe felony had been committed).
185. State v. Newton, 489 S.E.2d 147, 152-53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (Beasley, j.,
concurring). See also State v. Crook, 485 N.W.2d 726, 729-30 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992) (removal of hat without first "pat search[ing]" to search for
razor blade or other small weapon improper); People v. Collins, 463 P.2d
403, 406 (Cal. 1970) (cannot exceed the scope of a lawful pat-down upon
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This judge's reasoning reflects an analysis of the proper considerations that govern the scope of a protective search. An officer can only
achieve reasonable assurance that the suspect is not armed. Absent
information that the suspect utilizes razor blades or another small
weapon, the officer must accept some uncertainty that the suspect
may be harboring a small weapon. The police cannot search small
containers or other areas based on the speculation that it might contain a small or atypical weapon absent any information that the suspect is armed with such a weapon. Otherwise, the balance struck by
Terry would be eliminated and a protective search would be no different in intensity than a search incident to arrest.
In Holmes, it was a given that the police were faced with a suspect
that they reasonably believed was armed and dangerous. Is6 Under
Terry, the police officers were entitled to conduct a frisk of Holmes to
protect themselves. IS7 But accepting that premise does not mean that
they could go into Holmes's pocket. At the time that Phillip was
about to remove the hard object, Phillip knew the following: the
"'hard,' 'square' object" was not a gun; he thought it was a scale. ISS
Judge Roberts reasoned as follows that its removal was within the valid
scope of a Terry frisk: "The object did not feel like a firearm, but it
could have been another type of weapon-a box cutter, for example."Is9 Phillip had no reason to believe that Holmes had any such
unusual weapon; under the circumstances, the proper scope of the
frisk should have been limited to that necessary to locate the usual
weapons to assault police officers. Judge Roberts, instead, permitted
an intrusion based on observing that the object "might' be used as a
weapon. I90 Such speculative reasoning is inconsistent with the proper
scope of a frisk; to hold otherwise, permits general exploratory
searches, effectively obliterating the distinction between the limited
intrusion authorized by a Terry frisk and a search.
C.

Departures from Lower Courts' Legal Analysis to Uphold the Search

Judge Roberts demonstrated a willingness to depart from the lower
court's reasoning in Lawson and in Jackson to uphold the search.
Many courts would not engage in such analysis, finding instead that

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

speculation that object might be a razor blade or other atypical weapon
because, to do so, "would render meaningless Teny's requirement that patdowns be limited in scope absent articulable grounds for an additional
intrusion.") .
United States v. Holmes, 385 F.3d 786,790 (D.C. Cir. 2004), em. denied, 125
S. Ct. 1388 (2005).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 79l.
Id. (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968)).
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the claim is unpreserved. l9l Nonetheless, it is within the court's discretion to address unpreserved legal arguments, so long as there is no
dispute of the relevant facts. 192 In Lawson, the government raised the
issue for the first time on appeal and the appellant replied on the
merits, asserting that there was no probable cause to search based on
the facts developed at the hearing. 193 Given that the appellant in Lawson discussed the merits in his reply brief, it is perhaps less troublesome that Judge Roberts did also. On the other hand, such an
approach left the Jackson court divided over unclear facts. 194 Although few firm conclusions can be drawn, these cases may signal a
willingness by Chief Justice Roberts on the Supreme Court to go beyond the arguments of the parties and the reasoning of lower courts
to superimpose his legal reasoning in cases before the Court.
D.

Measuring Reasonableness

"The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that
searches and seizures be reasonable."195 This term is not self-defin191. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 334 Md. 178, 187-91, 638 A.2d 107, 112-14 (1994)
(collecting cases and discussing waiver of claim at suppression hearing
based on State's failure to argue probable cause ground).
192. See United States v. Garrett, 720 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (may affirm
on grounds other than those presented and relied on below).
193. United States v. Lawson, 410 F.3d 735, 740 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
194. Because Jackson did not argue in the district court that the police should
have conducted a more elaborate investigation, the lower court did not
make any factual finding as to when the suspect told the officers that the
car belonged to his girlfriend. Judge Roberts cited the following sections of
the hearing transcript:
Compare Hr'g Tr., June 9, 2003, at 62 ("I don't recall exactly when
the conversation took place in which he . . . informed us that his
girlfriend had purchased the vehicle at an auction.") (redirect of
Officer Garboe) with id. at 70 (Q. "Did you have any information
regarding this defendant or anyone else's possible ownership of
this particular vehicle prior to the search?" A. "No.") (Officer
Johnson).
United States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 105 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts,].
dissenting). Roberts concluded from these excerpts that Jackson's comments came after the search.
However, Judge Edwards, in his concurring opinion, relied on the explanation Jackson gave to the officers that he had borrowed the recently
purchased car from his girlfriend as undercutting the justification for the
search of the trunk. Id. at 100 (Edwards,]., concurring). To have relevance, that explanation had to have occurred prior to the search. Edwards
cited no record support for his view. Although it appears that Judge Roberts's conclusion as to when the search occurred had stronger support in
the record, the varying opinions of the two judges points to one reason why
many courts would remand for factual findings in lieu of reliance on ambiguous records to support a ground not articulated by the lower court.
195. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
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ing. 196 "The methods by which the courts address this challenge will
largely determine how much liberty we have and how much the government can intrude."197 As recently observed,198 in Wyoming v.
Houghton,199 the Court articulated a two-step model for measuring reasonableness: first, the Court inquired "whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when
the Amendment was framed;" and, second, if "that inquiry yields no
answer," the search or seizure is evaluated "under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests."2oo The Houghton test is an odd combination: if it
yields an answer, the common law at the time the Amendment was
framed, which was in 1791, is dispositive;201 if not, the balancing test is
196. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (quoting United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, j., dissenting),
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969):
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some
criterion of reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for
district judges or the police to say that an 'unreasonable search' is
forbidden-that the search must be reasonable. What is the test of
reason which makes a search reasonable?
197. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness, 2004
UTAH L. REv. 977, 1043 (2004).
198. See id. at 1014-15.
199. 526 U.S. 295 (1999). See generally Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why
the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U.
L. REv. 895 (2002) (discussing Houghton and the Court's inconsistent and
selective use of history).
200. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299-300. In Houghton, the Court was confronted with
the question "whether police officers violate the Fourth Amendment when
they search a passenger's personal belongings inside an automobile that
they have probable cause to believe contains contraband." Id. at 297. In
answering that question, the Court first turned to the common law inquiry
mandated by its new test. Based on founding era authorities, the Court
concluded that "the historical evidence [showed] that the Framers would
have regarded as reasonable (if there was probable cause) the warrantless
search of containers within an automobile." Id. at 300. The Court went on
to apply the balancing test as an alternative means of reaching the same
result. Id. at 303-07. Four Justices rejected the majority'S model of reasonableness. See id. at 307 (Breyer, j., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion
with the understanding that history is meant to inform, but not automatically to determine, the answer to a Fourth Amendment question."); id. at
311 n.3 (Stevens, j., dissenting, joined by Souter, j. and Ginsburg, j., dissenting) ("To my knowledge, we have never restricted ourselves to a twostep Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy and governmental
interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-century common law
'yields no answer.''').
201. The first part of Houghton implements Justice Scalia's strongly held view
that bases Fourth Amendment interpretation on the common law. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1991) (Scalia,j., concurring) (proposing that "the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment
affords the protection that the common law afforded" but adding "that
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used to evaluate the relative weights of contemporary governmental
needs and individual interests.
In prior cases, the Supreme Court had often relied on the common
law as a guide to ascertain the meaning of Fourth Amendment principles. Exacdy how that tool has been used, as with other interpretative
techniques, varied with who wrote the opinion. 202 However, Houghton's dispositive reliance on the common law as defining reasonableness where it yields an answer had never been used before in a Fourth
Amendment case. 203 "Also, contrary to Houghton, the historical abuses
that prompted the Amendment were more important to the Framers
than the common law search and seizure requirements, with the only
notable exception being the common law search warrant, which
served as the model for the Warrant Clause.''204 Moreover, using the
common law as the measure of reasonableness is distinct from using
the common law as the measure of the Framers' intent. As to the
former, the common law rule as of 1791 defines what is reasonable. As
to the latter, the common law is consulted to ascertain the Framers'
intent, which is in turn used to justify reliance on some conception of
reasonableness.
Judge Roberts in Hedgepeth cited Houghton as setting forth the first
step in the test for reasonableness. Did he do so because he felt
changes in the surrounding legal rules (for example, elimination of the
common law rule that reasonable, good-faith belief was no defense to absolute liability to trespass), may make a warrant indispensable to reasonableness where it once was not") (citation omitted); County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the balancing test applies to "novel questions of search and seizure" but not
to "resolving those questions on which a clear answer already existed in
1791 and has been generally adhered to by the traditions of our society ever
since") .
202. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (the Court is
"guided by" common law in ascertaining the meaning of reasonableness);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984) (While "[t]he common
law may guide consideration of what areas are protected by the Fourth
Amendment," common law rights are not co-incident with the Fourth
Amendment); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980) (common law
view utilized to shed light on Framers' intent); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 114 (1975) (common law acts as a guide to interpret Fourth Amendment). See also Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices:
Viewing the Supreme Court's Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
1387,1397-99 (2003) (observing that the Court's use of "history" is one type
of rhetorical argument that the Court has selectively used in its decisions).
203. Cf Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (stating
that the balancing test would apply" [a] t least in a case such as this, where
there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of
search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted");
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958) (utilizing supervisory
powers over the federal courts and reversing conviction based on the police's failure to comply with the common law requirement to announce
their purpose for demanding admission).
204. See generally Clancy, supra note 197, at 978-90, 1014-15.
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bound by it? If so, he ignored many other cases utilizing much different models of "reasonableness" analysis, each of which remain viable. 205 Or did he cite it because he accepts it as the proper measure of
reasonableness? If the latter is true, then his presence on the Court
will significantly shift the grounding of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. He would join Justices Scalia and Thomas in affording dispositive weight to the common law. Justice O'Connor, albeit not a model
of consistency in her Fourth Amendment analysis,206 was generally in
the camp that viewed the common law as illuminating the Framer's
intent and not dispositive of an issue; she was an advocate for the central role of individualized suspicion as an element of a search or
seizure. 207 She also wrote a dissent in Atwater, joined by three other
justices, wherein she reasoned in part that "history is just one of the
tools [the Court] use[s] in conducting the reasonableness inquiry."208
Thus, if Judge Roberts were in the "common law is dispositive" camp,
this would represent a strengthening of the view of the Fourth
Amendment that is, in my view, incorrect and, at bottom, unworkable. 209 On the other hand, Judge Roberts in Hedgepeth did not quote
the second part of the Houghton test, that is, that if the common law
did not yield an answer, the Court would employ a balancing test to
assess reasonableness. Instead, Judge Roberts looked to the "essential
purpose" of the Fourth Amendment, which is "to impose a standard
of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials."210 Was this language just a balm; it was, after all, pure dicta.
Or does it reflect his possible rejection of balancing and, instead, use
of other tools to ascertain reasonableness? Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts will view the reasonableness inquiry as neither a divining of the
state of the common law as of 1791 nor as an unprincipled balancing
of competing interests. Perhaps, in looking for the "essential pur205. See generally Clancy, supra note 197, at 1022-26 (discussing the Court's reasonableness models and observing that the Court has failed to establish a
hierarchy among them).
206. She joined the majority in Houghton, which set forth the common law as the
dispositive first step in reasonableness analysis. See Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999). But in Atwater, as discussed in the text, she
asserted that the common law was but one tool in that assessment. See
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 361 (O'Connor, j. dissenting); supra note 202 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47], 515 U.S. at 678 (O'Connor, j., dissenting)
(noting that "the individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree
as old as the Fourth Amendment itself').
208. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 361 (O'Connor, j., dissenting).
209. See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and the Common Law, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1739, 1739 (2000) (arguing that the recent cases of the
Supreme Court utilizing the common law as the principal criterion for assessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures are "faithful neither to
the text of the Amendment nor to what we know of its intent").
210. Hedgepeth v. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148, 1159 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979».
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pose" of the Amendment, he will see that process as "a weighted inquiry: one starts with a conception of what reasonableness is [;] [i] t is
a search or seizure based on objective criteria."211 To find such criteria, history is a vital tool, but it must be properly used to ascertain the
Framers' values and not to enshrine specific common law practices. 212
Moreover, in seeking to constrain official discretion, Judge Roberts
may look to the course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which
has demonstrated the need to retain objective standards. 213 Indeed,
the Court's other methods of assessing reasonableness have failed to
provide meaningful guidance and to protect individuals from ever-expanding governmental intrusions. 214 "In the end, however, the
Court's judgment should be informed by the fundamental purpose of
the Amendment: protecting individual security from unreasonable
governmental invasion. "215
III.

CONCLUSION

So what conclusions can we draw from Judge Roberts's record? In
each case, Judge Roberts sided with the government. In each case, he
relied on established precedent to ground his legal analysis. His opinions are tightly reasoned, often steering close to the line set by precedent. This is what intermediate appellate judges should do.
Certainly, some will disagree with him, based on the facts, whether a
particular action was justified. However, with the notable exception of
Holmes,Judge Roberts's view of the law was well grounded in Supreme
Court precedent to support it, particularly more recent Supreme
Court cases. Judge Roberts's record discloses a willingness-perhaps
even an eagerness-to depart from the reasoning of the lower courts
to uphold the governmental actions. The cases give significant insight
as to Judge Roberts's views on probable cause-including how weighty
that standard is and what tools should be employed to measure it.
Yet, much is unknown. How will Chief Justice Roberts address the
fundamental issues that will come before him about the Fourth
Amendment: what is the proper definition of a search, a seizure, or
how to measure reasonableness; what impact should technology have
on those definitions and, consequently, individual rights; what role
does privacy have in defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee of security; and what is the proper scope of the exclusionary rule in enforcing Fourth Amendment protections?
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213.
214.
215.

Clancy, supra note 197, at 1043.
See Clancy, supra note 197, at 1027-28.
Clancy, supra note 197, at 1027-28.
Clancy, supra note 197, at 1027-28.
Clancy, supra note 197, at 1044.

